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Key Decisions

Sullivan v. Citibank, N.A.

Blonder & Co., Inc. v. Citibank, N.A.

Mark Andrew v. GMAC Commercial Mortgage Corp.

National Union Fire Insurance Co. of
Pittsburgh, Pa. v. LSB Industries, Inc.


Enforcing Arbitration Decisions

Susy Sarfaty v. Safra National Bank

Hale v. Citibank

Toyota Tsusho America, Inc. v.
Crittenden and Langley, et al.


Hammerstein v. The Conference for Material Claims Against Germany, Inc.

Citibank, N.A. v. Trump Taj Mahal Associates, et al.

Qatar Nat'l Navig. & Trans.
Co. v. Citibank, N.A.

Sullivan v. Citibank, N.A.

ZEK successfully defended a bank against a claim for about $1 million arising from a six-year fraudulent scheme by a dishonest office manager/bookkeeper who stole checks payable to a chiropractor or to his practice, indorsed them in the name of the payee by using the employer's facsimile signature stamp and then deposited the checks into her account at the defendant bank. In Sullivan v. Citibank, N.A., 2003 WL 21465307 (2d Dep't June 23, 2003), the bank discovered the fraud and reported it to the chiropractor, who then sued the bank for breach of contract, conversion under UCC §3-419, etc.

Moving for summary judgment, the bank raised three UCC defenses: (1) it acted commercially reasonably (and had no proceeds of the stolen checks in its possession -§3-419(3)); (2) the plaintiff's lack of oversight of his finances and office operation constituted negligence that substantially contributed to the making of any forgeries, and the bank complied with reasonable commercial standards (§3-406); and (3) the indorsements on the stolen checks were actually authorized rather than forged because the plaintiff's employee used a facsimile stamp of plaintiff's own signature which he entrusted to her (§3-404).

The bank submitted expert and employee affidavits demonstrating that it handled the stolen checks in accordance with reasonable commercial standards applicable to its business. Plaintiff relied on his attorney's affirmation opining that the bank's procedures were inadequate.

The IAS court denied the bank's motion for summary judgment, finding "triable issues of fact as to whether Citibank acted in accordance with its own procedures, and whether those procedures comported with reasonable commercial standards in the industry." The Appellate Division, Second Department, unanimously reversed, holding that the bank met its burden of establishing that it was entitled to summary judgment pursuant to UCC §3-419(3) "by submitting a detailed comprehensive, expert affidavit concluding that its procedures in processing stolen checks comported with reasonable commercial standards regarding the processing of checks deposited in automated banking machines." The appellate court did not rule on the bank's other defenses, finding them "academic."

The decision is important because the bank defeated the payee's claims on summary judgment. Bank counsel often believe that defenses based on UCC §§3-419(3) and 3-406 may be asserted successfully only at trial because they are fact based, generally requiring a trial. ZEK was successful in demonstrating plaintiff's negligence based upon his own testimony of his complete failure to oversee the finances of his practice. (Although the Court based its written decision on other grounds, it seemed clear from questioning at oral argument that payee-plaintiff's substantial negligence was a real factor in the decision of the Court). At the same time, we believe that a forceful expert witness affidavit convinced the Appellate Division of the bank's commercial reasonableness.

Thus, the real significance of the Sullivan case is that bank defense counsel need not be faced with the choice of settling or proceeding with the expense and uncertainty of a trial in order to resolve a forged indorsement claim. The Sullivan decision provides a firm foundation upon which to build future summary judgment motions.



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